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NEGLIGENCE PER SE AND BROAD
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN ALASKA:
THE ADOPTION OF AN APPLICABLE
STATUTE AS AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD
OF CARE
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of the doctrine of negligence per se in cases involving the
violation of an applicable statute has been evolving in Alaska since the
Alaska Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Ferrell v. Baxter. 1 In Ferrell,
the court explicitly adopted the negligence per se rules set out in sec-
tions 286, 288A, and 288B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 2 The
negligence per se concept itself is elaborated in section 288B of the
Restatement:
(1) The unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an admin-
istrative regulation which is adopted by the court as defining the
standard of conduct of a reasonable man, is negligence in itself.(2) The unexcused violation of an enactment or regulation which is
not so adopted may be relevant evidence bearing on the issue of
negligent conduct.3
Although the Ferrell court limited its holding to cases in which a
traffic statute, regulation, or ordinance had been violated,4 the deci-
sions of the Alaska Supreme Court since Ferrell have demonstrated
the court's willingness to apply negligence per se to cases involving a
Copyright © 1985 by Alaska Law Review
1. 484 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1971).
2. Id. at 263; see infra text accompanying notes 3 and 11 (language of sections
288B and 286 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). Section 288A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts provides:
(1) An excused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative
regulation is not negligence.
(2) Unless the enactment or regulation is construed not to permit such ex-
cuse, its violation is excused when
(a) the violation is reasonable because of the actor's incapacity;
(b) he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for compliance;
(c) he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to comply;
(d) he is confronted by an emergency not due to his own misconduct;
(e) compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the actor or to
others.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965).
3. Id. at § 288B.
4. 484 P.2d at 263.
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wide variety of statutes,5 especially those which might be best charac-
terized as "safety statutes."'6 This note will first examine the rules the
Alaska Supreme Court developed and some of the cases it decided
prior to 1983 regarding the adoption of applicable statutes providing
appropriate standards of care in negligence per se actions. This note
will then argue that the Alaska Supreme Court has recently begun
approving the use of legislative and administrative enactments as the
basis for negligence per se instructions in cases where the enactments
would be more appropriately used as mere evidence of negligent
conduct.7
The Alaska Supreme Court's liberal new approach is especially
troubling because under this approach the court has submitted to jur-
ies as statements of the appropriate standard of care statutory stan-
dards that have not been clearly applicable to the facts of the cases
before the court. Thus, the court has appeared all too willing to allow
trial courts to usurp the jury's traditional role of determining the stan-
dard of conduct of the reasonable man in actions where a plaintiff has
alleged negligence and the violation of a statutory standard. While the
court likely has been motivated by a sincere desire to achieve the
"right result," its extremely broad construction of statutes, combined
with its ready approval of the use of negligence per se by the lower
courts, has fostered an appearance of arbitrariness which is unneces-
sary, undesirable, and unjustified. All too often, defendants accused of
negligence are found to have violated statutory standards that they
simply had no reason to believe applied to their conduct.
Finally, this note will suggest that in certain limited circum-
stances, the Alaska courts should use an evidence of negligence ap-
proach that would avoid an appearance of arbitrariness, while
allowing juries to maintain an active role in the resolution of negli-
5. "Statute" will be used in this note to include regulations and ordinances. It is
generally accepted in Alaska and elsewhere that the rules and procedures applicable to
statutes in negligence per se and evidence of negligence determinations also apply to
regulations and ordinances. See Ferrell, 484 P.2d at 260. Wilson v. City of Kotzebue,
627 P.2d 623 (Alaska 1981), provides an illustration of the role non-enforceable guide-
lines recommended by a state agency can play in a negligence action. According to
the Wilson court, the violation of "non-enforceable guidelines [provided by a state
agency may] be considered as evidence of negligence." Id. at 629-30. Since the provi-
sions found in a "Contract Jail Manual" involved in Wilson were neither legislative
enactments nor administrative regulations, the court found the doctrine of negligence
per se to be wholly inapplicable to the facts of the case. Id. at 629.
6. See generally Comment, Ferrell v. Baxter: Negligence Per Se in Alaska, 2
U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REv. 54, 67 (1972) (calling for extension of negligence per se to
areas beyond traffic statutes, including safety codes).
7. See supra text accompanying note 3 (explaining that the Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 288B(2) (1965) expressly authorizes the use of enactments as evidence of
negligence).
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gence actions grounded in whole or in part on the defendant's alleged
violation of a statutory standard of care.
II. 1971-1983: ESTABLISHING THE RULES UNDER THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
Considered as a group, the Alaska Supreme Court's decisions be-
tween 1971 and 1983 involving negligence per se provide a fairly clear
set of rules consistent with the policy considerations of "clarity, cer-
tainty, and justice" underlying the Ferrell decision.8 Beginning with
the general guidelines provided by the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
the Alaska Supreme Court decided several significant cases in the
twelve years following Ferrell that elaborated on the various consider-
ations governing a court's adoption of an applicable statute as an ap-
propriate standard of care in a negligence action. While not
exhaustive in its treatment, the following section examines several of
the most important cases decided by the court prior to 1983 in this
area of law.
A. Ferrell v. Baxter: Violations of Traffic Statutes Lead to
Alaska's Adoption of Negligence Per Se
As stated in the introduction to this note, in Ferrell v. Baxter, 9 the
Alaska Supreme Court adopted the Restatement's formulation of neg-
ligence per se10 for use in cases alleging that traffic statutes have been
violated. Section 286 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable
man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administra-
tive regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose in-
terest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has re-
sulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from
which the harm results. 1
As the Ferrell court noted, the rules found in section 286 of the
8. See infra text accompanying note 22.
9. 484 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1971). In the case, Ferrell, the driver of an automobile
involved in a collision with a tractor-trailer, was sued by one of the passengers in her
car for the injuries the passenger suffered in the crash. At the time of the accident,
Ferrell apparently had been driving too fast and had inadvertently crossed over into
the left-hand lane of oncoming traffic. Id. at 254. For an overview of the operation of
negligence per se in Alaska and a good discussion of Ferrell, see Comment, supra note
6.
10. See supra text accompanying note 2.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
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Restatement (Second) of Torts12 require that the statute allegedly vio-
lated be applicable to the facts of the case. Furthermore, once the
court determines that the statute applies to the defendant's alleged
conduct, the court must decide whether the enactment, as articulated,
provides a fair and just standard of reasonable behavior. 13 If the law
adopted by the court provides such a standard and the defendant's
violation of the statute is not excused, the violation will be held negli-
gence per se.14 Referring to one of its earlier decisions, Meyst v. East
Fifth Avenue Service, Inc., -5 the Ferrell court noted with approval that
trial courts have a certain amount of discretion in determining
whether an applicable traffic statute establishes a standard of reason-
able behavior.16 The court also noted that section 286 leaves a trial
court free "to refuse to adopt. . . a law as" defining the standard. 17
By recognizing the trial court's discretion to reject a statute as defining
the standard of reasonable care, the court was in essence recognizing
that some legislative enactments are not appropriate bases for negli-
gence per se instructions in certain instances because they do not pro-
vide standards of care which are just under the circumstances. The
legislature's passage of a statute should not, in itself, mandate that a
court use the statute as the basis for a negligence per se instruction.18
Even though courts may generally presume that traffic statutes pro-
vide acceptable standards of behavior,' 9 the Ferrell court itself realized
that in exceptional circumstances different standards may apply:
[I]t is conceivable that in highly unusual cases certain traffic laws
may be so obscure, oblique or irrational that they could not be said
as a matter of law to provide. . . a standard [of reasonable behav-
ior]. In the event the courts of this state are faced with such arbi-
trary and unreasonable laws, they may provide that violations
thereof merely indicate some evidence of negligence or no negli-
12. See supra text accompanying note 11.
13. Ferrell, 484 P.2d at 264.
14. Id.
15. 401 P.2d 430 (Alaska 1965) (jury given two instructions permitting, but not
requiring, finding that violation of ordinance was evidence of negligence).
16. 484 P.2d at 260.
17. Id. at 264.
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 286 (1965) (Courts may exercise
their discretion to adopt a legislative enactment or administrative regulation as the
standard of conduct of a reasonable man.).
19. According to the Ferrell court,
In promulgating traffic laws and regulations the legislature, sometimes ex-
pressly, but more often by implication, indicates a policy that a certain class
of individual be protected from a certain type of harm. . . . By enacting the
regulation pursuant to statutory authority, the Department of Public Safety
has implicitly indicated that no reasonable person would move from his lane
before ascertaining it could be done safely.
484 P.2d at 261.
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gence at all.2 0
In limiting the applicability of its decision to traffic law cases, the Fer-
rell court emphasized a special justification for using negligence per se
in such cases - namely, the driving public's almost universal knowl-
edge of traffic laws. Justice Connor, speaking for the Ferrell court,
stressed the imperative need for clear rules in traffic cases:
[P]eople must be able to govern their affairs according to known
standards. They must be able to protect themselves in advance, cur-
rently by purchasing defensive insurance, perhaps in the future by
some other means. They must also be able to take steps to make
themselves whole once again after sustaining injuries and property
damage.21
Seeking additional support for the court's adoption of negligence per
se rules in traffic cases, Justice Connor also argued that
[c]larity, certainty, and justice are the goals we seek. It is certainly
fair to require all drivers, who must be tested on these traffic laws
and regulations before they may obtain driver's licenses, to know
and obey the rules of the road. In few areas is the ancient presump-
tion of universal legal knowledge more fairly applied. It is both just
and accurate to presume that all reasonable drivers know and obey
the law, and to hold them civilly as well as criminally liable for any
unexcused violations thereof.22
Justice Rabinowitz dissented from the Ferrell majority's adoption
of negligence per se, preferring instead an "evidence of negligence"
approach. According to Justice Rabinowitz:
[A]n evidence of negligence rule is more easily grasped by jurors,
[and] presents fewer difficulties from the vantage point of judicial
administration. . . . In the end, I suppose the choice one makes is
dependent upon an evaluation of the performance of juries in negli-
gence actions. For my part, I would continue the common law's
long tradition of placing the responsibility for determination of the
standard of reasonable care with the jury.23
As the foregoing brief overview of Ferrell should suggest, the most
important determinations in a civil action based on negligence per se
are made by the trial judge. The judge must decide, first, whether the
statute the defendant allegedly violated applies to the facts which the
20. Id. at 260.
21. Id. at 262-63.
22. Id. at 263. In later decisions, the Alaska Supreme Court did not limit its
selection of applicable statutory standards to those almost "universally known" as it
had in Ferrell. With the supreme court's tacit approval, Alaska courts began to move
farther and farther away from the laudable goals and well-considered justifications set
forth by the Ferrell court for adopting negligence per se in traffic cases.
23. Id. at 271. Justice Rabinowitz also argued that negligence per se would have
a "drastic impact upon the resolution of contributory negligence issues." Id. Such
concerns are no longer present given Alaska's adoption of a pure comparative negli-
gence scheme. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975).
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jury might find or which are not in dispute, and second, whether the
law under consideration provides a fair and just standard of reasonable
behavior.24 The normal negligence considerations of causation, dam-
ages, and possible defenses typically are not affected by a jury's finding
that a statutory violation constitutes negligence per se. Even if a plain-
tiff prevails on a negligence per se instruction, he must still prove that
the defendant's negligence proximately caused his injury. Similarly,
the plaintiff must prove the extent of the damages he has suffered. The
negligent defendant, on the other hand, may present evidence of an
affirmative defense which could exculpate him from liability. This
note focuses on the trial judge's initial determinations in finding that a
statute applies to the facts of a case and provides an appropriate stan-
dard of behavior. While the Alaska Supreme Court has not explicitly
renounced the ground rules for utilizing negligence per se found in
Ferrell, its most recent decisions in this area unfortunately imply that
the Alaska courts will be able to bend, and perhaps break, these rules
in actual application if an appropriate factual situation suggesting the
"need" to do so comes before them.
B. Breitkreutz v. Baker: Recognizing the Need for a Precisely
Defined Statutory Standard of Care
In Breitkreutz v. Baker,25 decided two years after Ferrell, the
Alaska Supreme Court provided additional guidelines concerning the
type of statute that the lower courts could adopt as providing an ap-
propriate standard of care. According to the Breitkreutz court, when
a statute merely codifies the normal test of reasonable care and sets
"no precise standards that modify the common law,"2 6 a court should
not apply the negligence per se rules found in Ferrell.27 Negligence
24. Of course, in determining any negligence claim, the third determination that
must be made, namely whether the facts of the case establish that the alleged
tortfeasor actually violated the statute, and hence is negligent, is generally a question
for the jury (assuming that such facts are in dispute). The fourth determination,
whether an established violation may somehow be excused under the broad guidelines
of section 288A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, remains a question for both
judge and jury. First, the judge must construe the statute as one permitting conduct
to be excused. If the statute allows excuses, then in situations "where reasonable men
may differ as to the sufficiency of the excuse," Ferrell, 484 P.2d at 265 n.26 and
accompanying text, the jury, under proper instructions from the court, must deter-
mine whether a valid excuse exists for the defendant's behavior in the case. Id.
25. 514 P.2d 17 (Alaska 1973). In Breitkreutz, the plaintiff, Breitkreutz, was in-
jured in an automobile accident with the defendant and another driver, and unsuccess-
fully argued that the defendant's violation of a speed regulation entitled him to a
directed verdict on the issue of liability.
26. Id. at 20.
27. Id. at 20-21; see also Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671, 675-76 (Alaska 1981);
Bailey v. Lenord, 625 P.2d 849, 855-56 (Alaska 1981); Lynden Transport, Inc. v.
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per se instructions based on common law "reasonable care" statutes
provide the jury with no new standard of conduct to consider and
might only tend to confuse them. If a jury is erroneously instructed on
the basis of a reasonable care statute, its task is unchanged; it must still
apply its usual test of reasonable care under the circumstances in order
to determine whether the defendant's conduct was negligent. To avoid
possibly confusing the jury, the Breitkreutz court required that the lan-
guage of a statute adopted by a court articulate a specific standard of
care before a violation would constitute negligence per se. 28
Quoting an Ohio Supreme Court decision 29 with approval, the
Breitkreutz court stated, "if a positive and definite standard of care has
been established by legislative enactment whereby a jury may deter-
mine whether there has been a violation thereof by finding a single
issue of fact, a violation is negligence per se." °30 According to the
court, the standard of care embodied in a legislative enactment is "fi-
nal and conclusive" unless "it is so vague or dependent upon a variety
of facts and circumstances as to require definition by a court or jury
before it may be applied to the facts of a particular case."'31 In other
words, the standard of care must be patently clear from the language
of the statute before the statute may serve as the basis for a negligence
per se instruction. If the court must define and interpret a statutory
standard before presenting it to the jury, it is in effect imposing its own
standard on the jury in lieu of the legislature's standard. Similarly, if
the jury is left to define a particular statutory standard, it will likely
end up applying its own standard of care, which may be markedly
different from either the reasonable care standard which it would have
been required to formulate under traditional instructions from the
court or the standard actually intended by the legislature. If the ele-
ments of a statutory standard have not been clearly defined by the
legislature in the statute itself, then the principal reason for using the
statute in the first place - that it contains an appropriate standard of
care - simply disappears.
C. Bachner v. Rich: An Attempt to Clarify the Rules of Ferrell
and Breitkreutz
The Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Bachner v. Rich32 was
Haragen, 623 P.2d 789, 796-97 (Alaska 1981); McLinn v. Kodiak Electric Ass'n, 546
P.2d 1305, 1313-14 (Alaska 1976); Clabaugh v. Bottcher, 545 P.2d 172, 175-76
(Alaska 1976).
28. 514 P.2d at 22-23.
29. Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367, 119 N.E.2d 440 (1954).
30. 514 P.2d at 23 (quoting Eisenhuth, 161 Ohio St. at 374-75, 119 N.E.2d at
444).
31. Id.
32. 554 P.2d 430 (Alaska 1976).
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extremely important for several reasons. In Bachner, the court
adopted a non-traffic statute as the applicable standard of care in a
negligence action for the first time.33 After reiterating that the trial
judge is vested with discretion in determining, as a matter of law,
whether to adopt a legislative enactment or administrative regulation
as an appropriate standard of care,34 the court concluded that it was
just as reasonable to require a contractor to know and obey the mini-
mum safety standards set by the state for his occupation as it had been
in Ferrell to require a driver to adhere to the standards prescribed by
the traffic laws. 35
More importantly for the purposes of this note, the Bachner court
stated that Breitkreutz had generated some confusion concerning the
criteria a trial court should consider in deciding whether to adopt a
particular statutory standard of care. The Bachner court reempha-
sized that only a violation of an enactment that expressly provides a
specific course of conduct may constitute negligence per se; when a
statute expresses a rule of conduct in general or abstract terms, it may
not be the basis of a negligence per se instruction. 36 If one of the liti-
gants has proposed a "reasonable man" statute, 37 rather than a statute
articulating a specific standard of conduct, as an appropriate standard,
the court may simply choose to ignore the statute and refuse to frame
its jury instructions in terms of whether or not the statute was vio-
lated.38 In such cases, the traditional jury instructions based on the
33. Id. at 440 (adopting a General Safety Code provision promulgated by the
Alaska Department of Labor). The Bachner case involved an employee's action
against a general contractor for personal injuries suffered when the employee fell from
a scaffold while working for a subcontractor of the general contractor. Apparently,
the scaffold had been improperly constructed in violation of various provisions of the
General Safety Code. Id. at 439-41.
34. Id. at 440-41. The court in a footnote continued with an excellent summary
of the role of judge and jury following the adoption of a statutory standard of care:
Once the legislative enactment or administrative regulation is adopted as the
applicable standard of care, the role of the trial court is to then determine
whether there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably
infer that the statute or regulation was violated and whether there was suffi-
cient evidence of excuse to warrant submission of the latter issue to the jury.
Similarly, if jury issues are determined to exist as to either, or both, of those
issues, then it becomes the jury's task, under appropriate instructions, to
resolve such factual issues.
Id. at 441 n.12.
35. Id. at 441.
36. Id. at 441-42.
37. A "reasonable man" statute is one where liability is "determined by the appli-
cation of the test of due care as exercised by a reasonably prudent person under the
circumstances of the case." Id. at 442 (quoting Eisenhuth, 161 Ohio St. at 374, 119
N.E.2d at 444 (1954)).
38. Id. at 442.
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likely actions of the reasonably prudent person are sufficient.39 If the
statute is nevertheless deemed relevant to the facts of the case, the trial
court may exercise its discretion to inform the jury that a violation of
the statute is evidence of negligence. 4°
In a concurring opinion in Bachner, Justice Erwin referred to Jus-
tice Rabinowitz's dissent in Ferrell. Calling for a reexamination of the
doctrine of negligence per se for statutory violations, Justice Erwin
asserted that Justice Rabinowitz had been correct in suggesting that
negligence per se deemphasized the traditional role of the jury in de-
termining the standard of reasonable care4 and that an "evidence of
negligence" approach was preferable. 42 Furthermore, Justice Erwin
observed that it was "becoming extremely difficult to undertake any
business endeavor without violating some regulation. '43 Justice Erwin
suggested that the use of negligence per se can become somewhat
problematic under present-day circumstances where government
safety regulations at the federal, state, and local levels "are proliferat-
ing at an incredible rate."44
Justice Erwin's concurrence highlights many of the potential
problems arising from the application of negligence per se. This note
neither suggests that the negligence per se doctrine should never be
utilized, nor that it should be completely replaced by an evidence of
negligence approach as Justice Erwin suggested in his concurring
opinion in Bachner. Instead, the courts should re-adopt the original
framework found in sections 286, 288A, and 288B of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. Used properly, these sections allow a court to use
either the "negligence per se" approach or the "evidence of negli-
gence" approach as any particular fact situation might require.
D. McLinn v. Kodiak Electric Association: Refusing to Apply
Negligence Per Se Where the Terms of a Statute's
Coverage Are Imprecise
In McLinn v. Kodiak Electric Association,45 the Alaska Supreme
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Ferrell, 484 P.2d at 265).
41. Id. at 449. "The focus of determining the standard of reasonable care shifts
from the jury to the judge who must rule whether or not a statute or regulation has
been violated and thus the party is guilty of negligence per se. The proper label
removes the issue from jury consideration." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.; see also Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49
COLUM. L. Rlv. 21, 21 (1949).
45. 546 P.2d 1305 (Alaska 1976). The plaintiff in McLinn, a three-year old, was
injured when she stumbled into the wheel of a boat trailer pulled by a truck on a
public street. McLinn, by her next friend, brought suit against the corporation which
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Court drew upon its explicit recognition in Ferrell that circumstances
might occasionally arise that would justify a court's refusal to adopt a
statute as defining an appropriate standard of conduct in a negligence
action.46 Surprisingly, the supreme court refused to apply a precise
statutory standard stated in a regulation 47 which expressly required
the defendant, a utility, to take certain minimum precautionary meas-
ures when working on its installations "on, over or under highway
rights of way."48 Under the facts of the case, the utility had clearly
failed to take such precautions.4 9
Two factors convinced the supreme court to accept the superior
court's conclusion that a reasonably prudent person in the defendant's
situation would not have been aware that the regulation in question
applied to his conduct. First, under the facts presented by the parties,
the status of the road where the defendant's employees had been work-
ing was ambiguous. Simply stated, if the road was a state highway,
the regulation directly applied to the defendant's conduct; if the road
was a city street, the regulation did not apply. For the supreme court
to have decided the question either way would have been somewhat
arbitrary.50 Second, the precise coverage of the regulation itself was
unclear.51 Based on these two factors, the reviewing court concluded
that a negligence per se instruction was not warranted, and that the
superior court had not abused its discretion by failing to give such an
instruction. 52
had blocked off the portion of the street in order to install a utility pole. Id. at 1306-
07.
46. The McLinn court affirmed a superior court decision in which the jury had
been instructed that an alleged violation of an administrative regulation (ALASKA
ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, § 15.130 (repealed May 1982)) was not negligence per se, but
rather merely evidence of negligence. Id. at 1313-14.
47. See supra note 46.
48. McLinn, 546 P.2d at 1307 n.4. Under the facts of McLinn, the minimum
precautionary measure required would have been the posting of a flagman at the work
site, as recommended by the Uniform Manual on Traffic Control Devices for Streets
and Highways, Bureau of Public Roads, which was adopted by ALASKA ADMIN.
CODE tit. 17, § 15.130 (repealed May 1982). Id.
49. Id. at 1306.
50. The McLinn court apparently chose not to remand the case to the lower court
for further findings of fact concerning the road's true status. See id. at 1314.
51. Id.
52. The analysis employed and the result reached by the McLinn court are both
quite consistent with the approach suggested by this note. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 119-31. When a statute is imprecise in its coverage and of questionable
applicability, it should not be construed to establish an appropriate standard of care
for the application of negligence per se. Assuming that normal evidentiary require-
ments, especially relevancy, are satisfied, the statute should be submitted to the jury as
evidence of negligence. See infra text accompanying notes 122-24; see also James,
Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REV. 95, 114-16
(1950).
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E. Ferriss v. Texaco, Inc.: Relative Obscurity of a Regulation's
Applicability Precludes Finding of Error in Trial Court's
Failure to Adopt it as Standard of Care
In Ferriss v. Texaco, Inc.,53 the Alaska Supreme Court deter-
mined that the "relative obscurity" of the National Electrical Safety
Code's applicability to the defendant Texaco's actions justified the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury that a violation of the Code was
negligence per se.54 Ferriss, an employee of the contractor engaged by
Texaco to install metal canopies above some gasoline pumps, sued
Texaco for electrical shock injuries he suffered while working on the
canopies when a piece of angle iron he was holding touched a high-
voltage power line.55
Citing Ferrell, the court argued that while all drivers could be
presumed to be familiar with traffic laws, the same assumption could
not be made concerning a landowner's knowledge of the National
Electrical Safety Code.56 In particular, the court determined that "the
specific distances allowable from lines of varying voltages are not
within general knowledge in the same manner as driving regula-
tions."' 57 Nevertheless, the court did find that the lower court had
erred in refusing to allow evidence of the Code to be presented to the
jury. The court specifically found that the provisions of the Code were
applicable to Texaco because Texaco had erected a building within the
prohibited distance of a high-voltage electrical line.58 Texaco's viola-
tion of the regulation was thus relevant evidence of its negligent
conduct.
The Ferriss decision is consistent with the court's earlier decision
in McLinn,59 and with the general approach suggested in this
53. 599 P.2d 161 (Alaska 1979).
54. Id. at 164. According to the court, there was "some basis for confusion as to
the applicability of the National Electrical Safety Code to other than new electrical
installations or alterations of existing installations." Id. The requirements of the Na-
tional Electrical Safety Code, unlike the traffic laws, were simply not generally known.
55. Id. at 162.
56. Id. at 164.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 163-64. Although the court found that the lower court had erred in
refusing to allow evidence of the Code to be presented to the jury, it held this error to
be harmless since a safety inspector had testified concerning the minimum safe dis-
tance from the top of the structure at issue in the case to various power lines. Ferriss
was therefore able indirectly to present the same evidence to the jury that the Code
itself would have provided.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 45-52. Of course, in McLinn, the question
was whether a statute of imprecise coverage and questionable applicability should be
adopted by the court to provide a standard of care appropriate for use in a negligence
per se instruction. In Ferriss, the statute in question clearly applied to the defendant's
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note.6° Under the supreme court's holding in Ferriss, the violation of a
statute not likely, nor reasonably, within the defendant's general
knowledge prior to the institution of a negligence action against him
should not constitute negligence per se. Instead, such violations
should be submitted to the jury as evidence of negligence if they are
relevant to the negligence issues in the case. While not explicitly
stated in the court's opinion, it would appear that the court's concern
for justice and fairness, as well as its recognition that per se rules
should not be applied mechanically, dictated its holding in Ferriss. By
balancing the interests of both the plaintiff and the defendant, and fol-
lowing the Restatement's formulation of the negligence per se doctrine,
the court was able to reach a compromise solution not unreasonably
harsh for either party to the suit.
F. Johnson v. State: A Regulation's Inapplicability and
Ambiguity Are Adequate Grounds for Its Rejection
as a Standard of Care
The key determination made by the Alaska Supreme Court in
Johnson v. State 61 was whether the statute and administrative regula-
tion allegedly violated by the state applied to the facts of the case.62 In
Johnson, the plaintiff brought a negligence action against the state for
injuries arising from a bicycle accident at a railroad crossing which the
state allegedly had maintained improperly.6 3 The statute and regula-
tion in question prescribed a statutory standard of care for utility per-
mit holders working on a facility across or along a highway. The
permit holders were to take all measures necessary to provide for con-
tinued travel along the highways and specifically to erect warning
signs near any hazards across or along any highway "during construc-
tion or maintenance of a facility authorized by a utility permit." 64
Although the plaintiff argued that the statute's own definition of
"maintenance" 65 made the statute and regulation applicable to the
state's activities, the state convinced both the trial court and the
conduct. The question then became whether the statute's obscurity should bar its use
in a negligence per se instruction.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 119-31.
61. 636 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1981).
62. The defendant allegedly violated ALASKA STAT. § 19.25.010 (1981) and
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, § 15.060(a) (repealed May 1982).
63. 636 P.2d at 50-51.
64. Id. at 59-60 (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, § 15.060(a)).
65. According to the statute's definition, "'maintenance' means the preservation
of each type of highway, roadside structure and facility as nearly as possible in its
original condition as constructed, or as subsequently improved, and the operation of
highway facilities and services to provide satisfactory and safe highways." ALASKA
STAT. § 19.05.130(9) (1971) (quoted in Johnson, 636 P.2d at 60).
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supreme court that the regulatory obligation to erect adequate hazard
signs only applied when city crews were performing actual work 66 at
the site where the plaintiff had been injured. Because no actual main-
tenance work was being performed at the site when the plaintiff's acci-
dent occurred, the supreme court concluded, as had the trial court,
that the regulatory standard did not apply to the case and, therefore,
could be rejected as the basis for a negligence per se instruction. 67
The Johnson court also held that the regulation was sufficiently
ambiguous that a reasonably prudent person could not have deter-
mined whether it was applicable to other than active maintenance
work. Given these factors, the supreme court concluded that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in refusing to grant the plaintiff's
request for a negligence per se instruction.68 Since the regulation did
not apply to the facts presented, the court refused to consider whether
the arguably ambiguous regulatory standard could ever serve as the
basis for a negligence per se instruction.6 9
The Johnson case clearly demonstrates the simple but sometimes
forgotten requirement that a statute be applicable to the facts of the
case before it can be used to support a negligence per se instruction to
a jury or a negligence per se determination by a court. Courts seeking
to reach the "right result" through the use of negligence per se by
ignoring the narrow'scope of the applicability requirement will often
find it necessary to engage in a creative, but questionable, construction
of a statute in order to find it applicable to a defendant's conduct. 70
G. Metcalf v. Wilbur, Inc.: Applying a "Clearly Erroneous"
Standard when Evaluating Trial Courts' Refusals of
Negligence Per Se Instructions
In Metcalf v. Wilbur, Inc.,7 1 a passenger and his wife brought an
action against a pilot and aircraft owner for injuries they had sustained
in a plane crash.72 The Alaska Supreme Court held that the superior
court had erred in refusing to give a negligence per se instruction be-
cause it had based its refusal on a fact determination that the supreme
court found to be "clearly erroneous. ' 73 The lower court rejected a
particular regulatory standard as a basis for the requested negligence
66. Johnson, 636 P.2d at 60.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing McLinn, 546 P.2d at 1314).
69. Id. at 60-61.
70. See, e.g., infra notes 79-118 and accompanying text.
71. 645 P.2d 163 (Alaska 1982).
72. Id. at 165-66.
73. The fact in question was whether the airplane's take-off had been attempted
under "visual flight rules" or under "instrument flight rules." The resolution of this
issue would determine which Federal Aviation Rule, if any, was applicable.
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per se instruction, not because the regulation lAcked specificity in
defining a standard of care, but rather because the court found that the
statute did not apply to the facts of the case. Once the underlying
operative facts had been "changed" by the supreme court's interpreta-
tion of the evidence, the statutory standard became applicable and
could serve as the basis for a negligence per se instruction.
The Metcalf decision once again highlights the significance of the
initial determination a court must make in deciding whether a negli-
gence per se instruction is proper - namely, whether the standard
itself applies (at least arguably) to the facts of the case. The Metcalf
opinion's emphasis on this initial aspect of the negligence per se ques-
tion is especially important in light of the supreme court's most recent
decisions in this area of law. These decisions are discussed in section
four of this note.
III. SUMMARIZING THE RULES FOUND IN THE PRE-1983 CASES:
A DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY CONSISTENT WITH A FAIR
AND JUST APPLICATION OF THE NEGLIGENCE
PER SE DOCTRINE
As the foregoing discussion of the pre-1983 case law should sug-
gest, if a court wishes to utilize a statutory standard in a negligence per
se instruction, it must first ascertain whether the statute itself is di-
rectly applicable to the facts of the case by considering the four criteria
listed in section 286 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.74
If a statute does not apply to the facts of the case, the court does
not have to consider it any further. If the statute is applicable, how-
ever, the court should then exercise its discretion and determine
whether the statute provides a fair and just standard of reasonable be-
havior which can, and should, be substituted for the usual common
law standard of reasonable care. Indeed, section 286 of the Restate-
ment explicitly provides that a court "may adopt," rather than "shall
adopt," a statute for the purpose of defining an appropriate standard
of conduct. 75 The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized several rea-
sons for finding statutes inappropriate as standards of conduct: (1) ob-
scurity, obliqueness, or irrationality; (2) arbitrariness; (3) imprecision
or ambiguity; (4) arcane or unreasonable formulation (making compli-
ance virtually impossible); (5) and harshness (imposing liability with-
out fault).76 Although a court may find a particular statute an
inappropriate basis for a negligence per se instruction, it can always
submit the alleged violation of an applicable, but inappropriate, statu-
74. See supra text accompanying note 11.
75. See supra text accompanying note 11.
76. See, e.g., cases discussed supra text accompanying notes 8-73; see also North-
ern Lights Motel, Inc. v. Sweaney, 561 P.2d 1176, 1184-85 (Alaska 1977).
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tory standard to the jury as possible evidence of the defendant's
negligence.
Even if a court determines that a statute provides a fair and just
standard of reasonable behavior, it should still adjudge the statute in-
appropriate for use in a negligence per se instruction if the statute
merely codifies the common law reasonable man standard. In such
cases, a court should not frame its instructions in terms of whether the
defendant violated the statute, but rather should frame its instructions
in terms of whether the defendant's actions satisfy the "reasonably
prudent person" standard under the circumstances. Testimony sug-
gesting that the defendant violated a statute codifying the common
law, however, may still be submitted to the jury if the court deems the
violation relevant evidence of negligence.
If a statute satisfies the "fair and just standard of reasonable be-
havior" test articulated in Ferrell, the court still has to find that the
statute provides a positive and definite standard of care. In other
words, the court must determine that a jury would be able to deter-
mine whether the statute had been violated by finding a single issue of
fact. Once the statute is found to provide a positive and definite stan-
dard of care, and the plaintiff can show that the record contains suffi-
cient evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the
defendant violated the statutory standard,77 the plaintiff then becomes
entitled to an instruction based on negligence per se as long as no justi-
fiable excuse for the violation had been proved by the defendant and
accepted by the court.78
77. The test used to determine whether a plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence
to demonstrate a defendant's alleged statutory violation
is whether the facts and resulting inferences are such that reasonable people,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party seeking the
instruction, could justifiably have different views on the question. If they
could, then the question should be submitted to the jury under the appropri-
ate instructions. If they could not, then submitting the issue to the jury
would not be justified.
Godfrey v. Hemenway, 617 P.2d 3, 7-8 (Alaska 1980). Given this test, if it appears
that the statute in question, for whatever reason, was clearly not violated, then a negli-
gence per se instruction would certainly be inappropriate.
78. Although the Alaska courts have recognized various excuses for the violation
of statutory standards in negligence per se cases, an examination of such excuses is
beyond the scope of this note. For examples of the types of excuses that are explicitly
authorized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288A, see supra note 2.
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IV. 1983: BIRTH OF THE "Two-STEP" TEST - IN THEORY,
LITTLE CHANGE; IN PRACTICE, SOME REAL PROBLEMS
A. State Mechanical, Inc. v. Liquid Air, Inc.: Streamlining the
Finer Points of Negligence Per Se
In State Mechanical, Inc. v. Liquid Air, Inc.,79 the supreme court
suggested a two-step test for determining whether a particular statute
contains an appropriate standard for creating a negligence per se
instruction:
First, [the trial court] must determine whether the conduct at issue
lies within the ambit of the statute or regulation in question, by ap-
plying the four criteria set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 286 (1965). Second, once the trial court has concluded that the
statute or regulation applies to the allegedly negligent conduct, the
court must further determine whether the rule of law is so obscure,
unknown, outdated, or arbitrary as to make inequitable its adoption
as a standard of reasonable care.80
In the court's words, the first portion of the test to be applied by
the lower courts is "strictly a legal conclusion, and we [as a reviewing
court] will exercise our independent judgment in deciding whether the
trial court interpreted the scope of the statute or regulation cor-
rectly."181 The standard of review of a lower court's determination of
the statute's applicability is therefore "substitution of judgment. '8 2
The reviewing court is to accord greater deference to the trial court's
decision to adopt or reject the statute or regulation as an appropriate
basis for a negligence per se instruction. As the supreme court had
noted in its earlier decisions, 3 the trial court's disposition of whether
an enactment is too obscure, unknown, or arbitrary to be used as a
standard of reasonable care will be reversed on appeal only if the deci-
sion constitutes an abuse of discretion.84
79. 665 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1983).
80. Id. at 18-19 (citations omitted).
81. State Mechanical, 665 P.2d at 19.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Northern Lights Motel, Inc. v. Sweaney, 561 P.2d 1176, 1184
(Alaska 1977) (abuse of discretion explicitly adopted by Alaska Supreme Court for
first time as standard of review for lower court's decision to adopt statutory standard
of care).
84. State Mechanical, 665 P.2d at 19. Although the State Mechanical court rec-
ognized the trial court's discretion to refuse to give a negligence per se instruction, it
limited this discretion to "highly. unusual cases." Id. (citing Ferrell, 484 P.2d at 260).
This limiting language is from Ferrell, but the court seems to have interpreted it much
more broadly in State Mechanical than it originally suggested would be appropriate in
FerrelL The Ferrell limitation was restricted to traffic laws, which were recognized as
seldom being too obscure to be used in negligence per se instructions. If the trial
court's discretion to reject a statutory standard is limited to "highly unusual cases,"
notwithstanding the nature of the statute and the likelihood that it establishes a stan-
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On its face, the State Mechanical court's two-step inquiry appears
very similar to the pre-1983 approach developed in Ferrell and its
progeny. 5 When examined closely, however, the State Mechanical
decision contains a very troublesome development, namely, the
supreme court's apparent willingness to stretch the coverage of stat-
utes to conduct they clearly do not, and should not, reach. While seri-
ous in itself, the court's broad construction of statutes - particularly
safety statutes - has made the doctrine of negligence per se a readily
available, but extremely harsh, tool which has led to some very ques-
tionable results.
In State Mechanical, for example, the court found an admittedly
ambiguous statute applicable to the defendant's conduct in the case,86
and then permitted that broadly construed statutory standard to serve
as the foundation for a negligence per se instruction. The standard at
issue, a provision of the General Safety Code,8 7 stated that pressurized
"[c]ylinders shall not be kept in unventilated enclosures such as lock-
ers and cupboards. 88 The wording of the subsection containing this
particular provision, however, suggested that it might pertain solely to
cylinders stored "inside of buildings."8' 9 The defendants in State
Mechanical had placed an acetylene cylinder in an unventilated, en-
closed container outdoors at a construction site. Gas leaking from the
cylinder exploded and one of the defendant's employees was injured. 90
The supreme court rejected State Mechanical's argument that the
regulation applied only to cylinders stored inside of finished buildings.
According to the court:
The regulation makes no sense if it can be read to allow storage of
cylinders in enclosed containers everywhere except inside finished
dard of reasonable behavior, the supreme court would probably accept the argument
that the trial court should presume that any applicable statute provides an appropriate
standard for use in a negligence per se instruction. As this note has stressed, however,
the mere fact that a statute is applicable to the facts of a case by itself does not, and
should not, be the sole test of whether it is an appropriate basis for a negligence per se
instruction.
85. Absent from the State Mechanical test is the requirement that the standard be
examined to see whether it provides a positive and definite standard of care rather
than a mere duplication of the common law duty to act reasonably under the circum-
stances. This oversight, however, was corrected in later decisions. See, e.g., Osborne
v. Russell, 669 P.2d 550, 554 (Alaska 1983); Harned v. Dura Corp., 665 P.2d 5, 12
(Alaska 1983).
86. 665 P.2d at 20.
87. GENERAL SAFETY CODE § 01.1002(a)(2)(B)(ii) (adopted in ALASKA ADMIN.
CODE tit. 8, § 66.010 (repealed 1975)). The text of the section may be found in State
Mechanical, 665 P.2d at 19).
88. Id.
89. Id. The first three words of the subsection read: "Inside of buildings ..
GENERAL SAFETY CODE § 01.1002(a)(2)(B)(ii).
90. State Mechanical, 665 P.2d at 17.
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buildings. While we do not agree with [the plaintiff] that the provi-
sion is unambiguous, this court has recognized in the past that the
provisions of the [General Safety Code] ...should be given a
broad interpretation. 91
The supreme court therefore concluded that the superior court had
properly ruled that the regulation applied to State Mechanical's con-
duct in the case.92
The supreme court also rejected State Mechanical's argument
that the regulation "should not be adopted as a negligence per se stan-
dard of care because of the lack of requisite notice of enforcement to
the community. ' 93 Interpreting this argument as suggesting that the
obscurity of the regulation should have precluded its adoption as an
appropriate standard of care, the supreme court summarily rejected
the argument by noting the trial court's broad discretion to adopt stat-
utes which provide standards of reasonable care, even in the face of
obscurity arguments. 94
The supreme court's interpretation of State Mechanical's argu-
ment does not appear to be correct. Clearly, State Mechanical was not
suggesting that the regulation itself was unknown or obscure, but
rather was arguing that the regulation's applicability to State Mechan-
ical's conduct was unknown until the trial court decided to construe
the regulation broadly enough to make it applicable. The question the
court should have examined was not whether the law under considera-
tion objectively provided a standard of reasonable behavior, but instead
whether applying the standard to the defendant's behavior was fair
and just given the facts of the case. Under Ferrell, a statute provides
an appropriate standard for negligence per se only if it supplies an
objectively clear standard of behavior and also can be imposed fairly
in a particular case.
A regulation prohibiting the storage of cylinders in unventilated,
enclosed containers inside of buildings certainly does define a standard
of reasonable behavior. However, construing this regulation to apply
also to containers located outside of buildings on construction sites is
neither fair nor just if the defendant, though aware of the regulation's
existence, had no reason to believe that it applied to his course of con-
duct. As the supreme court itself pointed out in this case, the scope of
the regulation under consideration was ambiguous.95 Until the court
interpreted the regulation's language, 96 the regulation's applicability
to any type of cylinder storage beyond that expressly provided for on
91. Id. at 20.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See supra text accompanying note 91.
96. Of course, another means of ascertaining the regulation's applicability would
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its face remained highly speculative. Arguably, the regulation should
not have been applicable to any situation it did not expressly mention,
because its language was quite specific. Without a clear finding that
State Mechanical was aware that the regulation likely applied to its
behavior, the trial court's decision to submit a negligence per se in-
struction to the jury based on the regulation should have been held to
constitute an abuse of its discretion.
Under the circumstances of State Mechanical, the supreme court
perhaps should have availed itself of the opportunity to submit the
violation of the regulatory standard to the jury as evidence of negli-
gence rather than as part of a negligence per se instruction. Surely the
legislature's clear dictate that cylinders not be stored in unventilated
enclosures inside of buildings had some relevance to whether the de-
fendant's identical act outside of a building on a construction site was
negligent. By submitting the regulation to the jury as evidence of neg-
ligence, the court could have afforded significant weight to the legisla-
ture's probable intent of promoting safe workplaces without
overburdening the defendant with an absolute standard of care that a
reasonably prudent person could not have anticipated.
Before resolving the claim against State Mechanical, the supreme
court should have reconsidered a statement by Justice Holmes which
it had quoted in Ferrell: "It is not intended that the public force
should fall upon an individual accidentally, or at the whim of any
body of men. The [legal] standard, that is, must be fixed."'97 Until a
statute's requirements and coverage are fixed, the standard of care
contained in the statute should not be applied mechanistically. Often,
as in State Mechanical, the mechanistic application of a statutory stan-
dard will turn out to be both unfair and unjust.
B. Harned v. Dura Corporation: Ignoring a Clear Statutory
Exemption When Determining a Statute's Applicability
In Harned v. Dura Corporation,98 the supreme court concluded
that the trial court had erred in declining to instruct the jury that the
defendant's failure to manufacture a compressed air tank in accord-
ance with the provisions of a regulatory safety code9 9 that had been
incorporated by reference into Alaska law constituted negligence per
have been for the legislature or appropriate state agency to clarify the wording of the
regulation.
97. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 110-11 (1881) (quoted in Ferrell v. Baxter,
484 P.2d 250, 263 (Alaska 1971)).
98. 665 P.2d 5 (Alaska 1983).
99. After statehood, the Alaska Department of Labor ratified the American Soci-
ety of Mechanical Engineers' "Boiler Construction Code" pursuant to express statu-
tory authority. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.60.180-.395 (1981); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE
tit. 8, § 80.010(a) (July 1984).
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se. 10 The trial court had submitted the statutory standard to the jury
as evidence of negligence. The statute by its express terms did not
apply to any tank less than five cubic feet in volume unless the tank
was to be used in a place of public assembly. The volume of the tank
the defendant had manufactured was indisputably less than five cubic
feet, so the statutory standards the plaintiff proposed were only di-
rectly applicable to the resolution of its case if the site where the plain-
tiff had been injured was a place of public assembly.
In ruling that the trial court should have instructed the jury that
a violation of the safety code provision constituted negligence per se,
the supreme court refused to decide whether the site of the accident
was a "place of public assembly." The court's attempt to explain its
refusal to find facts on this question suggests a willingness by the court
to rewrite express legislative enactments if it believes this modification
is necessary to protect the public. Surprisingly, the court first declared
that manufacturers should not be allowed to rely on the express terms
of the statutory exemption. According to the court, it was a mere
"fortuity" that the defendant's tank arguably fell within the scope of
the exemption, since manufacturers generally "have no control over
where the tanks they produce will be utilized." 101 After refusing to
extend the statutory exemption to manufacturers, the court went on to
hold that such manufacturers nonetheless had a duty to manufacture
"pressure vessels" in accordance with the regulatory standards found
in the statute.'0 2
While the court's analysis seems reasonable from a public policy
viewpoint, it does not justify the court's refusal to determine whether
the specific exemption contained in the statute truly applied to the
facts of this case. For whatever reason, the legislature had determined
that pressurized tanks of five cubic feet or less need satisfy certain stat-
utory standards only when such tanks are used in public places. As
the Ferrell court noted more than a decade ago, the law allegedly vio-
lated by a defendant must be applicable to the situation presented to
the court 0 3 before it can be adopted as a fair and just standard of
reasonable care for use in a negligence per se instruction. Under the
Ferrell test, the court should not have determined that the statutory
standard applied to the case without first deciding whether the acci-
dent site was a public place. If the court felt compelled to issue a
negligence per se instruction, it should at least have made the jury
aware of the exemption so that the jury then could have determined
whether the defendant had indeed violated the statute.
100. 665 P.2d at 14.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Ferrell, 484 P.2d at 264.
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As it had in State Mechanical, the supreme court in Harned, after
making the broad conceptual leap necessary to render an arguably
inapplicable statutory standard applicable to the defendant's conduct,
invoked the doctrine of negligence per se with little hesitation. I1 4 In
the process, the supreme court overturned the lower court's decision
to submit the standard to the jury as evidence of negligence. If the
supreme court had accepted the evidence of negligence approach, it
would have avoided the seemingly arbitrary determination of the stat-
ute's applicability which it must have felt compelled to make in order
to reach the "correct result."10 5 Compared with the negligence per se
doctrine's requirement that a statute be directly applicable to the facts
of a case, the relevancy requirement of the evidence of negligence ap-
proach places a much less rigorous burden on the party seeking to use
a statutory standard to bolster his position at trial. The facts of State
Mechanical and Harned would easily have allowed the plaintiffs to
introduce the statutory violations involved in those cases as evidence
of negligence. These facts were not sufficient, however, to warrant the
application of negligence per se in either of the cases.
C. Osborne v. Russell: Construing a Safety Statute Broadly in
Order to Render It Applicable to a Defendant's Conduct
In its most recent decision involving negligence per se, Osborne v.
Russell, 10 6 the Alaska Supreme Court continued the trend it began in
State Mechanical of construing safety statutes broadly in order to find
them applicable to a defendant's conduct. In Osborne, an exposed
wire connected to a circuit breaker inadvertantly became energized
and electrocuted plaintiff's decedent while he was working in a restau-
rant. The personal representative of the decedent's estate alleged that
an electrician had been negligent in his electrical work in the restau-
rant and filed a wrongful death action against him. 0 7 The supreme
court exercised its independent judgment to find that even though a
provision of the 1978 National Electrical Code'0 8 was entitled
"splices," its directive that "the free ends of conductors shall be cov-
ered with an insulation equivalent to that of the conductors or with an
insulating device suitable for the purpose"' I0 9 applied to all conductors,
not merely to spliced and energized wires. 10 The court sought
104. 665 P.2d at 12-13.
105. The jury at the trial court level had found for the defendant under the evi-
dence of negligence instruction. Id. at 6.
106. 669 P.2d 550 (Alaska 1983).
107. Id. at 552.
108. NATIONAL ELECTRICAL CODE § 110-14(b) (1978) (text of section may be
found in Osborne, 669 P.2d at 554 n.2).
109. Osborne, 669 P.2d at 554 n.2.
110. Id. at 554-55.
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additional support for its conclusion in a separate subsection of the
Code" l1 which specified that "[c]onductors shall be insulated." 112 The
court construed the two provisions together and concluded that it
would not be "sensible" to limit them solely to spliced and energized
wires connected to closed circuits, since the sections were enacted "to
protect persons from exactly the sort of accident which occurred in
this case."113
After dispensing with the potential barrier of the statute's inappli-
cability, the supreme court concluded that the only other possible rea-
son the superior court had failed to instruct the jury on negligence per
se might have been its determination that the provisions "were 'too
vague or arcane' to be used as a standard of care."' 1 4 The supreme
court rejected this rationale because the provisions containing the spe-
cific requirement that wires be insulated were directed expressly to
professional electricians like the defendant Russell. According to the
supreme court: "[U]nder these circumstances there was no area of
discretion in which the [trial] court could act." ' 5 After considering
all of these factors, the supreme court concluded that the superior
court had erred in refusing to give the plaintiff's requested negligence
per se instruction.116 Furthermore, finding that reasonable persons
could not have disagreed as to whether the defendant had complied
with the terms of the statute as the court had construed it, 117 the
supreme court concluded that Osborne's motion for a directed verdict
as to negligence should also have been granted.118
As in State Mechanical, the court in Osborne never paused to con-
sider whether use of the statutory standard of care was fair and just
under the facts of the case. Once again, a strong argument can be
made that the use of negligence per se in Osborne was inappropriate
because the defendant could not have foreseen the broad construction
given the statutory provisions in question. If the alleged violation of
111. Id. at 555 (referring to § 310-2 of the NATIONAL ELECTRIC CODE, the text of
which may be found at 669 P.2d 554 n.2).
112. Id. at 554 n.2.
113. Id. at 555.
114. Id.
115. Id. Given the court's conclusion, one wonders what became of the trial
court's discretion to adopt or reject a statutory standard of care, since the discretion-
ary decision in Osborne should have been reversed by the reviewing court only if the
trial court had abused its discretion. Apparently, in this case the supreme court's
finding of applicability, combined with the specificity and content of the safety code
provision, made the provision an appropriate basis for a negligence per se instruction.
Implicitly, the supreme court must have found that the trial court had abused its
discretion in not adopting the statutory standard.
116. Id.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Id.
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the statutory standard had been submitted as mere evidence of negli-
gence, the jury, rather than the court, would have determined the issue
of negligence in the case - an extremely important difference, given
the court's recent predilection toward construing safety statutes quite
broadly.
V. VIOLATIONS OF SAFETY STATUTES AS EVIDENCE
OF NEGLIGENCE
As previously discussed, 1 9 when a court has found that a statute
does not provide a standard of conduct appropriate for a negligence
per se instruction, the court may still accept a violation of that statute
as relevant evidence bearing upon the reasonableness of the defend-
ant's conduct. 120 Indeed, comment d to section 288B of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts advocates this approach:
particularly where the provision in question prescribes standard
precautions for a purpose other than the protection of the person
who is injured, or for protection against a hazard other than that
from which the harm has resulted. The fact that such precautions
have been prescribed for another purpose may be a relevant fact for
the consideration of the triers of fact, as indicating that a reasonable
man would have taken the same precautions in the particular
case. 
12 1
According to Professor James, if a statute, although breached, is
found not to govern the exact fact situation before a court, the statute
itself should not be considered as fixing an appropriate standard of
conduct. Instead, if the statute satisfies normal relevancy require-
ments, it should then be considered merely as evidence of the appro-
priate standard.122 Similarly, where a defendant technically has not
violated a statute because it does not cover the precise fact situation
before the court, the statute, if sufficiently relevant, should still be uti-
lized as evidence of the appropriate standard of behavior in a "suffi-
ciently analogous situation."' 23 In James's words:
[S]hould not safety rules made to govern private power companies
119. See supra text accompanying notes 3, 42, and 52.
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B comment d (1965); see also
James, supra note 52, at 110-12; Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legisla-
tion, 16 MINN. L. REv. 361, 377 (1932); Note, Hassan v. Stafford: Admission of Ad-
ministrative Regulations as Evidence of Standard of Care in Negligence Cases, 47
TEMP. L.Q. 739, 740-46 (1974).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B comment d (1965); see also
James, supra note 52, at 110 ("Virtually all courts seem to agree that [a legislative]
enactment should be considered unless it is irrelevant in the sense that its subject
matter has nothing to do with the case.").
122. James, supra note 52, at 114 n.65.
123. Id. at 115; see also Morrow, The Use of OSHA in Negligence Suits Against
Those Responsible for the Maintenance of Safe Work Sites, 1978 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE
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deserve consideration in evaluating the conduct of municipally
owned power systems? And may not precautions required of mo-
torists having the right of way as they approach highway intersec-
tions be some guide to proper behavior in approaching the
intersection with a private road?124
The value of a statute, or rather of a statutory violation, in a neg-
ligence action need not be linked solely to its use as a basis for finding
negligence per se; indeed, a criminal statute can often serve a useful,
though not conclusive, function in a negligence action. An evidence of
negligence approach is one well-recognized means1 25 of giving effect to
a relevant statute - and to the legislature's expertise and considered
opinion contained within the statute - that avoids many of the
problems that arise when courts inappropriately attempt to force
relevant statutes into inapplicable fact situations by construing their
provisions liberally, and then using them as the basis for a negligence
per se instruction to the jury.
Professor Morris, another commentator, has suggested that an in-
struction to a jury "that the breach of a criminal statute is evidence of
negligence amounts to a warning to the jury that the legislature has a
standard and that jurymen should be cautious about substituting one
of their own." 126 Furthermore, Morris argues that the use of an evi-
dence of negligence procedure is appropriate in cases
in which the judge doubts the suitability of the legislature's criminal
standard for the decision of the tort case before him, and yet is not
sure enough of his doubts to instruct the jury that the legislative
standard should be disregarded, and therefore is willing to allow the
jury to decide the ethical as well as the factual sub-issue of fault on
their own power, unembarrassed by advice.127
In a case where a court would have to construe a safety statute
extremely broadly to justify an application of negligence per se,' 2 8
Professor Morris's suggestion provides an attractive alternative to neg-
ligence per se, namely, an evidence of negligence approach. Further-
more, Morris's suggestion is completely consistent with pre-1983
167, 185-86 (providing examples of jury instructions where relevant safety regulations
had been submitted as evidence of negligence).
124. James, supra note 52, at 115-16 (citations omitted); see also Morrow, supra
note 123, at 167-72. "Once it is established that a duty of due care is owed to the
plaintiff by the defendant, then applicable OSHA regulations may be admissible as
evidence of what a reasonable man in defendant's position would have done under the
circumstances." Morrow, supra note 123, at 169-70.
125. See supra text accompanying note 3 (explaining that section 228B(2) of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts permits the evidence of negligence approach).
126. Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV. L. REv.
453, 461 (1933).
127. Id.; see also Comment, Torts - Violation of Criminal Statutes as Negligence
Per Se or Mere Evidence of Negligence, 1950 WASH. U.L.Q. 280, 284-85.
128. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 79-118.
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Alaska law. In the future, rather than engage in somewhat artificial
negligence per se determinations, the Alaska courts should submit al-
leged statutory violations to juries as mere evidence of negligence
when the statutes themselves are likely inapplicable to the defendant's
conduct or simply fail to provide appropriate standards of care.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since 1983, the Alaska Supreme Court has embarked on a pro-
gram of construing arguably inapplicable safety statutes broadly in or-
der to allow it to apply the doctrine of negligence per se to defendants
who may not actually have violated these statutes. Unfortunately, the
Alaska courts apparently have failed to recognize the full implications
of following this course of conduct. To a very real extent, using negli-
gence per se as the courts have in recent years undermines the ration-
ale for the supreme court's adoption of the doctrine in 1971. When
the coverage of a legislative enactment has been left ambiguous, the
standard of care expressed in the statute, although certain in itself, is
uncertain in its application until construed by a court or clarified by
the legislature. 129
One of the principal justifications for the negligence per se doc-
trine is that a reasonable man knows and obeys criminal statutes.
1 30
If, however, an individual has no reason to know that a statutory stan-
dard of care governs his conduct, he may violate that standard while
pursuing a course of otherwise reasonably prudent conduct.131
In arguing for an evidence of negligence approach in Bachner,
Justice Erwin suggested that the negligence per se doctrine produced
harsh results when the number of "applicable" regulatory standards
was proliferating at a fantastic rate. A similar criticism can be raised
when arguably inapplicable safety statutes are being drawn into cases
through broad statutory construction and the liberal use of negligence
per se. Indeed, it is extremely easy to violate a legislative enactment
that sets a specific standard of care different from another standard
that one might otherwise follow as a reasonable man under the cir-
cumstances. Despite the ancient presumption of universal legal
129. See Morris, supra note 44, at 29-32. "In many of the cases in which courts
obdurately use the doctrine of negligence per se to hold a non-faulty violator guilty of
negligence, a proper interpretation of the statute might produce a sounder result." Id.
at 30.
130. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971); Morris, supra note
126, at 454; Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317, 322-23
(1914).
131. See Morris, supra note 44, at 33. "One who ignores important regulations
might well have been reasonably prudent before their enactment; but once a definite
standard has been set by the criminal law the reasonably prudent man usually tries to
comply." Id.
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knowledge, when a statute is ambiguous on its face so that its applica-
bility remains unclear, the issue of notice to the defendant becomes
important in determining whether the use of negligence per se may be
considered truly fair and just in a particular case.
An evidence of negligence approach for the violation of a statute,
especially when the statute has been broadly construed to render it
applicable to the defendant's conduct, avoids many of the harsh, seem-
ingly arbitrary results occasionally produced under negligence per se.
In close cases, under an evidence of negligence instruction, the jury is
able to place the defendant's violation of an arguably ambiguous statu-
tory standard in proper perspective by considering whether the court's
extremely broad construction of the statute should forestall a finding
of negligence. The great flexibility of the evidence of negligence ap-
proach makes it a truly attractive option for the court when a defend-
ant was likely unaware that a particular statutory standard applied to
his behavior.
Finally, the Alaska courts' more frequent use of an "evidence of
negligence" approach in close cases would not represent a dramatic
departure from the rules that the court followed prior to 1983. The
framework which the Alaska Supreme Court adopted in 1971 in the
Ferrell decision and which it developed over the next twelve years
should be resurrected and given continuing vitality. Significantly, no
new legal ground need be broken to accomplish the result argued for
in this note; pre-1983 precedent and procedures simply must be re-
examined and followed. The Alaska courts should remember that the
Ferrell rules expressly authorized the use of "evidence of negligence"
where the use of negligence per se would be inequitable. Reaching the
"right result" is important, but if the right result is not reached in the
"right" way, clarity, certainty, and justice will almost certainly be sac-
rificed in the process.
Richard A. Frank
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